We study the global competition among private equity (PE) buyout firms. Using a detailed data set of PE firm characteristics, we investigate how PE firm heterogeneity across strategy and performance affects the volume of cross-border acquisitions. A onestandard-deviation increase in performance is associated with an approximate doubling of the number of deals in a given country. We also find that transaction costs associated with geographic, cultural, and administrative distance matter to different degrees for different PE firms, and that these differences are related to fundamental characteristics of the firms.
Introduction
A large literature in finance and international economics has established a set of stylized facts about the determinants of cross-border economic flows. At the bilateral country level, frictions associated with geographic, cultural, and administrative distance are consistently found to influence the pattern of bilateral economic flows, including trade in goods and services, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), portfolio investments, and migration. Remoteness continues to matter despite advances in transportation and information technology. A second stylized fact speaks to the selection of firms that are able to succeed in international markets despite the disadvantages of remoteness. Heterogeneity in ability leads to a hierarchy of firms: the best performers are able to remain competitive in more distant foreign markets, whereas lower-ability firms find foreign entry unprofitable given the additional costs. Transaction costs, hereafter broadly defined as both static and dynamic costs that result from frictions associated with cross-border acquisitions and eventual exits, thus imply a trade-off between proximity and ability.
Our paper considers this trade-off for the case of private equity (PE) firms' global acquisitions through leveraged buyout (LBO) funds, the specialized investment vehicles, which in 2011 accounted for $77 billion, or 15% of all cross-border M&A deals by value (World Investment Report, 2012) . These deals represent an important slice of economic activity in their own right, but are typically dropped in studies of cross-border M&A.
1 Because of the unique organizational structure of PE buyout firms (or PE firms hereafter) and the available data, this study allows us to look for and uncover rich interactions between transaction costs and PE firm characteristics.
The core difference between strategic and LBO deals lies in the distinct economic motivations. Strategic buyers are in search of operational synergy, whereas PE firms, or the financial buyers, are in search of returns. As such, the former does not usually require an exit strategy and presumably aspires to make long-term combined enterprise improvements.
Strategic buyers should be less sensitive to the macroeconomic and industrial conditions affecting the target purchase price than the financial buyers. Significant determinants of many strategic acquisitions will be difficult to generalize because of the highly idiosyncratic operational synergy, whereas we posit that determinants of LBO acquisitions can be mapped to distinguishing features that form the underlying heterogeneity of PE firms.
Following Head and Ries (2008) we view each acquisition as an outcome of the international market for corporate control.
2 In this formulation, each acquirer places a valuation on each potential target company. The PE firm with the highest valuation makes the highest bid for the target and wins the stylized auction for control. Valuations differ across PE firms because of the value-adding ability of firms, because of different transaction costs of managing a portfolio of companies, and because of idiosyncratic match-specific synergies.
To formalize the intuition, we build a model similar to the one in Head and Ries (2008) , and develop a testable equation that relates the number of acquisitions by each PE firm in each target country to the costs of remote ownership, PE firm's ability, and the degree to which PE firms can mitigate these transaction costs. Previous studies on the determinants of cross-border M&A find the importance of costs of remote ownership. In this paper, we contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence on an additional channel that could affect cross-border transactions, namely, the PE firm's heterogeneity in ability and cost mitigation. We believe that the institutional characteristics of PE firms make this international competition particularly salient, because they are less likely to have valuations driven by synergies and be less susceptible to empire building. Moreover, these two dimensions of heterogeneity, which are specific to PE firms, offer an opportunity to test aspects of this theory rather directly.
As suggested by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) , we take the view that PE firms' managers (and the funds they manage) possess underlying ability, leading to persistence in perfor-mance. Thus, PE firms that perform well in a given period will, in expectation, perform well in subsequent periods. The first heterogeneity in ability is analogous to firm productivity being an inherent firm trait in the international trade literature (e.g., Melitz, 2003) . In that context, it has been documented that high-productivity firms are more likely to export (Bernard and Bradford Jensen, 1999) and undertake foreign direct investment (Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004) . We find that the heterogeneity in PE firms' performance, a proxy for ability, is important in cross-border LBOs. In particular, we similarly find that highperforming PE firms are more likely to carry out cross-border investments and to acquire more target companies in each country than low-performing PE firms.
We introduce heterogeneity in transaction-cost mitigation into the theory on cross-border acquisitions. This source of variation across PE firms is distinct from value-adding ability, and is crucial in understanding variation in the international intensity of firms. While PE firms with high ability will acquire more targets abroad, they will also win more deals at home. This increase is proportional in standard models, including ours. In contrast, cost mitigation lowers the effective cost of remote ownership faced by the PE firm, and thus increases the likelihood of an acquisition for remote potential targets.
PE firms do not all follow a common strategy, and we base our measure of cost mitigation on survey data on the main applied strategies for each PE firm. We argue that these profiles are systematically related to transaction-cost mitigation. For example, PE firms that specialize in hands-on management will be particularly affected by the transaction costs of remote ownership. These strategies, which rely on limited human capital and path dependent experience, can be a source of lasting competitive advantage because other PE firms are not able to simply copy the market leaders.
3
One implication of this second dimension of heterogeneity is that some PE firms with mediocre value-adding ability may still be successful internationally because of their transaction cost-mitigating strategy. We should observe these PE firms winning more deals abroad 3 In private equity, fund flow and access to deal flow is a direct function of past performance.
than at home relative to PE firms with average cost mitigation. Indeed, our index of cost mitigation is significantly correlated with the international intensity of a PE firm's successful acquisitions.
We use bilateral country variables relating to geographic, cultural, and legal differences to proxy for transaction costs of remote ownership. Empirical results suggest these measures are correlated with the number of deals occurring between two countries, a finding consistent with studies on strategic M&A (e.g. Erel, Liao, and Weisbach, 2012) .
Furthermore, we find that the effects of our cost proxies are significantly stronger for PE firms with investment strategies associated with low transaction-cost mitigation. In particular, PE firms that rely on active managerial engagement with target companies and that specialize in managing intangible assets are subject to bigger costs associated with remote cross-border LBO deals. PE firms that specialize in the strategy of consolidation and growth are less impacted by costs of remoteness. These findings suggest that heterogeneity in transaction-cost mitigation provides an additional source of variation in the outcome of this international competition for corporate control.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of related literature. Section 3 introduces a stylized model, which serves to guide our hypotheses and estimating equations. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents our main empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions have been studied by a number of recent papers (among others, Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Erel, Liao, and Weisbach, 2012; Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi, 2012) . These studies find that geography, culture, investor protection, accounting disclosure, bilateral trade, corporate governance, and valuation play the leading roles in motivating foreign mergers. Importantly, these are studies of strategic buyers-primarily industrial firms with real assets-who look for synergies from the transactions through the channels of economies of scale, vertical integration, and business diversification. The samples of these studies explicitly exclude all LBO deals, which are the main focus of this paper.
Aizenman and Kendall (2008) study cross-border venture capital and private equity flows in a gravity framework and find that geographic and cultural distance, technological and human-capital development, and business conditions are statistically significant drivers of these cross-border investments. They also provide some evidence that firms that are more internationally oriented participate in larger deals on average. We are able to look more directly at firm level heterogeneity and study its effect on cross-border investment flows.
Cornelius, Juttmann, and de Veer (2009) study the home bias of LBO funds and the aggregate home bias in different regions of the world. They find that the funds based in the United Kingdom are the least home biased, although they show a large degree of intraEuropean bias. The funds based in the United States are the least home biased on an inter-regional basis. At the fund level, those LBO funds are found to show lower home bias than portfolio (mutual) funds.
Humphery-Jenner, Sautner, and Suchard (2012) look at cross-border strategic M&A that are backed by PE firms. PE firms in their study perform the financial intermediary role, and are not the direct buyers of a target. Their results suggest PE firms act as international networks that reduce information asymmetries in cross-border M&A.
Demiroglu and James (2010) study the relation between the reputation of PE firms and their financing terms with banks, using a sample of 180 LBO deals between 1997 and 2007.
They find that PE firms are more active when credit market conditions improve, and that financing terms are more favorable for the firms with better reputation. In the related work, Meuleman and Wright (2011) study the likelihood that a cross-border LBO deal is syndicated with target local banks, using a particular sample of private equity investors in United
Kingdom and continental-European targets. We focus on cross-border LBO transactions using a broader sample and abstract from the specifics of deal financing.
Several recent papers focus on the comparison between strategic acquirers and financial acquirers (primarily PE firms). Martos-Vila, Rhodes-Kropf, and Harford (2013) use a model to demonstrate that debt mis-valuation has an impact on the shifting dominance of financial acquirers relative to strategic acquirers. Dittmar, Li, and Nain (2012) find that strategic acquirers who pursue a target which financial acquirers also bid on outperform otherwise similar strategic acquirers without the competition with a financial acquirer. Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2008) find that private acquirers (primarily PE firms) pay much less than public acquirers in M&A.
Model
We develop a model of a competitive market for control and ownership of potential target companies by PE firms. The model builds on Head and Ries (2008) , who analyze the aggregate bilateral and multilateral stocks of FDI. Our model departs from theirs in two significant ways. First, we derive the estimating equations to motivate firm-level regressions, and second, we introduce two dimensions of PE firm's heterogeneity. We use discrete choice theory to determine the probability that a given PE firm will win a stylized auction for control of a potential target company. This probability is a function of variables for which we have observable proxies. From this probability, we derive the expected number of deals won by each PE firm in each target country and show this number to be related to key firm-level characteristics, in addition to frictions at the bilateral country level.
Each PE firm (investor), i, is endowed with an ability a i , which directly adds value to any target company under its control. Similarly, each potential target company (seller), s, contributes value b s . Upon a successful buyout, the PE firm incurs transaction costs, c hd , associated with managing the portfolio company, where h is the home country of investor i and d is the country of target s. We assume that these costs are zero for domestic deals.
For cross-border deals, PE firms are heterogeneous in their ability to mitigate costs, and so the total effective costs are given by z i c hd . For example, the general partners of a PE firm must monitor their portfolio managers to ensure that they do not shirk. The cost of this monitoring is given by z i c hd , where c hd is a function of bilateral country characteristics such as geographic and cultural distance, and z i , an inverse measure of mitigation ability, is a function of the PE firm's strategic orientation and is exogenously determined by the expertise of the PE firm's managers. 4 Therefore, the total transaction cost is a function of the effects of the PE firm i, the home country h, and the target country d. Because the target company, s, usually changes in each transaction, we leave its effect in an idiosyncratic match value, is , which, for reasons explained below, is drawn from the standard Gumbel (Type I extreme value) distribution with cumulative distribution function F (x) = e −e −x .
Given the notations above, a PE firm i values the acquisition of a target s as follows:
where
We assume that target firms are sold under a mechanism of a first-price auction such that the PE firms with higher valuations bid the highest and make the acquisition. 5 A PE firm i will have the highest valuation if V is > max j =i {V js }. Under the Gumbel distribution, this probability is given by the multinomial logit formula:
Equation (2) could be estimated using multivariate logit if we knew the full set of potential target firms. Instead, we can recognize that the product of the probability of a PE firm i winning a deal in country d and the number of potential target companies in country d gives the expected number of deals in country d won by the PE firm i:
where 
. Equation (4) can be consistently estimated using Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation (PMLE). Alternatively, we can drop observations for which X id = 0 and take logarithms of both sides of equation (4) to obtain
where e id = ln η id . In Section 5 we estimate equations (4) and (5) using PE firms' performance as a proxy for the ability, a i , PE firms' strategies as proxies for the cost mitigation, z i , bilateral frictions related to geographic and cultural distance as proxies for c hd , and country fixed effects as a proxy for γ d .
Data
We collect the bilateral country level variables on geographic distance, common language, and common legal origin from the CEPII gravity database. 6 The database provides populationweighted great circle distance between large cities of each country pair and is based on the data collected in Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010 Robinson and Sensoy (2011), and Phalippou (2014) .
Each deal is associated with a target company and year, and is sponsored by one or more funds, each of which is owned by a PE firm. A target company could be involved in more than one deal over time, representing a chain of levered recapitalizations. If the same target company receives financing by a given PE firm in the same year, we do not distinguish them as different deals, but aggregate these partial acquisitions into a single completed deal corresponding to the PE firm and target company.
Of the 7,543 deals, 270 include deal size (in various international currencies) and total equity investment. The difference between the two values divided by deal size yields leverage.
Since many deals are sponsored by a consortium of funds, the computed leverage represents an aggregate leverage of the deal's co-sponsors. Further restricting this set to deals with a single buyer PE firm reduces the sample size to 192. A notable observation is that the mean leverage of cross-border deals among this restricted sample is 51.3% (53 observations) whereas the mean leverage of domestic deals is 43.4% (139 observations). The difference is statistically significant. Further attempts to relate capital structure of deals to PE firms'
6 The database is available at cepii.fr performance and/or strategies do not yield significant and stable results, largely because of the limited sample size relative to the total number of controls. Given these data limitations, we abstract from controlling for the heterogeneity in the financing terms when study the determination of cross-border LBOs.
It is well known in the literature on strategic M&A that time-varying macroeconomic forces play a role in shaping the pattern of deal flows. For example, previous literature finds merger waves for strategic deals (e.g., Harford, 2005) . We document a similar pattern for LBO deals. Figure 1 shows the number of cross-border and within-border deals for both strategic and LBO transactions. The sample of strategic M&A from 1990 to 2013 is collected from Security Data Corporation's (SDC) Mergers and Corporate Transactions data set. We keep completed deals, and exclude LBOs, IPOs, recapitalizations, repurchases, partial equity stake purchases, and acquisitions of remaining interest, as well as deals in which the target or the acquirer is in the financial or utilities industry, and in which the home or target nation information is missing. Two interesting results emerge. First, cross-border and within-border transactions have a similar movement for both strategic and LBO deals. For LBO deals, the number of cross-border deals and the number of within-border deals gradually increase before the 2007 financial crisis, and then decrease afterwards. Second, the strategic and LBO deals have a similar movement after the burst of the dotcom bubble. These patterns suggest that some common macro determinants documented in Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012) are also likely to affect LBO deals.
7 Figure 2 shows the trends in the number of LBO funds, as well as their size and performance (in net multiples). The number and the value of the fund raised are consistent with the number of deals presented in Figure 1 . Those statistics are also comparable to other proprietary databases widely used in the literature (e.g., Acharya, Gottschalg, Hahn, and Kehoe, 2013; Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan, 2014; Sensoy, Wang, and Weisbach, 2014) .
Though a general decline in performance is shown in Figure 2 , Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2014) conclude that LBO funds highly likely outperformed the public markets in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Table 1 provides a summary of bilateral country-level LBO deal counts. The columns represent the countries of the acquirers whereas the rows represent those of the targets. To emphasize the importance of geography on cross-border transactions, we sort countries by continents (America, Europe, and Asia-Australasia) and by the number of deals. In this table, we drop the acquirer or the target countries that have fewer than 10 LBO deals in the sample period. Because of this treatment, the total number in the last row or column does not reflect the actual total number of deals for each country in our sample. Kingdom are the predominant players in LBO deals, making up more than three-quarters of all acquisitions. Second, the cross-border LBO activity is largely intra-continental, as the off-diagonal blocks are much sparser than the diagonal (continental) blocks. This pattern is consistent with the idea that the proximity is an important factor in cross-border LBO transactions.
Preqin 2013 offers capital-weighted performance information, including Internal Rate of Return (IRR); quartile ranking bench-marked by vintage year, region and type; and multiples. Performance data are cumulative as of the second quarter of 2013. This data set also provides a comprehensive array of information related to expertise, applied strategies, financing structure, and preferred target company characteristics of each PE firm. These pieces of information are based on a survey carried out by the data vendor and completed by PE firms' managers. Figure 3 shows that strategic advice and financial expertise are the types of expertise most frequently identified by PE firms' managers. This observation is consistent with the prevalence of former management consultants and investment bankers entering private equity, whose human capital will be most correlated with expertise in strategic advice and financial engineering. The survey data also reveal an overwhelming preference for a controlling shareholding position, suggestive of implementing managerial improvements. Figure 4 shows the preferences regarding target company situations. We take these preferences as describing strategies related to the selection of targets by fund managers. Lee and Li (2014) provide a more detailed set of summary statistics of PE firm data using the same data set. Their work relates cross-sectional variation of PE firm characteristics to performance using several models, and distinguishes venture capital from buyout investments. They find that strategy profiles and target company preferences are driven by the expertise of the PE firms' managers. Acharya, Gottschalg, Hahn, and Kehoe (2013) and Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2008) employ human capital based managerial expertise as instruments for applied strategies of funds. As such, we view strategy profiles, including the screening of potential target companies for particular characteristics, as arising from the pre-determined expertise of general partners.
Empirical Analysis
We cumulate the data over the period 1986 to 2013 to obtain the number of acquisitions by each PE firm in each target country. The full sample includes 663 firms from 47 home countries investing in 84 target countries, for a total of 55,692 observations at the firmtarget country level. However, only 1,760 of these observations are non-zero in the sample.
This represents the maximum number of observations available for our OLS specification, which uses the logarithm of the deal count as the dependent variable. A total of 29,873
observations are associated with country pairs for which at least one PE firm from the home country invested in the target country. This represents the maximum number of observations available for our PMLE specifications. Discrepancies from these figures in each regression are due to missing data for some of the independent variables.
Defining Empirical Proxy Variables
To move from the theoretical number of deals by firm-target country to an estimable equation, we require proxies for the PE firm's ability, a i , the bilateral transaction costs, c hd , and the PE firm's cost mitigation, z i . We use the PE firm's performance, as measured by its internal rate of return (IRR) weighted over each of its funds, as a proxy for the PE firm's ability. Transaction costs are represented by a dummy for cross-border country pairs (equal to one except in the case where the target country is equal to the home country), the logarithm of geographic distance, and dummies for different official language and different legal origins. We also construct a transaction cost index equal to
where BigDistance is a dummy variable equal to one when the geographic distance is greater than average. The cost index takes on values 0 through 4, with approximately equal numbers of observations in each category.
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Our proxy for PE firm heterogeneity in the mitigation of transaction costs is based on their main investment strategies and target preferences. Based on the descriptions, we have ex ante reasons to believe that some strategies will be subject to transaction cost frictions more than others. We think of the theoretical variable z i as varying in a continuum from zero to one, where a value of zero means that the PE firm is able to entirely circumvent the cost of remoteness, and a value of one means that the PE firm incurs the full cost. The strategy profile of each PE firm maps into this continuum and provides an empirical measure of the transaction cost mitigation of the PE firm. Given the qualitative nature of strategies, this mapping is fairly crude, but patterns in the data suggest this measure of cost mitigation is informative for predicting outcomes in expected ways.
8 The cost index can easily include other variables such as the religion, colony status, time difference, accounting standards, legal protections, and so forth. Inclusion of these variables does not change our results, but some of them are highly correlated with each other. Therefore, we keep the cost index parsimonious. Table 2 provides a list of the strategies and target preferences we believe should be linked to the incidence of transaction costs. The strategies and target preferences are ordered into five strategy groups. We focus on the group instead of individual component for two reasons.
First, the survey data contain many strategies and target preferences. It is difficult to present the results of each of them in detail. Second, many strategies and target preferences are similar in nature. Grouping them together reduces the potential for multicollinearity and measurement error.
The first group is consolidation and growth, which consists of six strategies and two preferred target situations. The target preferences reveal that the private equity firm's strategies are related to consolidation and growth. The international business literature suggests that M&A is the preferred mode of entry for firms in distant markets because this approach allows them to readily tap into local business networks. For similar reasons, we imagine that PE firms that look to consolidation and growth for portfolio companies, which is close to M&A, will have an easier time in foreign markets. On the other hand, if the consolidation requires an established local network for access to merger opportunities, or expert knowledge in the local settings for growth, consolidation and growth strategy would exacerbate the cost of international acquisition. Hence, we allow the empirical test to reveal the more likely interpretation of this strategy group.
The second group is management, which has three strategies and three preferred target situations. Firms that take a management alignment, hands-on, or a day-to-day involvement approach to the management of portfolio companies are likely to feel the effects of remoteness more acutely. Managers will need to travel or be assigned to companies in less familiar environments. Such an investment strategy will be well-suited for targets that are underperforming, have succession issues, or are family businesses. The cost of remoteness is likely to be more severe for these PE firms. However, in an alternative view, if an active management style (hands-on, day-to-day involvement, and managerial incentive alignment) reduces delegation and coordination costs, which are likely pronounced in engaging with a management team abroad, the expected impact of management and human resource strategy group would be cost mitigating.
The third group is market positioning, which suggests that the private equity firms may either prefer targets with good market positions or have strong positioning skills. Given a good market position, the private equity firms may find it easier to increase the value of portfolio companies. On the other hand, it may be difficult to identify targets with good market positions in distant markets. Its impact is not clear ex ante.
The fourth group is called idea-core. The PE firms in this group are likely to prefer targets with unique technology and patents. This preference may increase the cost of cross-border transactions. First, intellectual property is intangible and subject to legal risks. Reducing this risk is likely to result in more costly contract negotiations. Second, unique technology and patents can be sensitive assets to national security, and it is difficult to acquire for foreign buyers. For example, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) reviews the national security implications of foreign investments in U.S. companies or operations, and some cross-border transactions may not be approved. It increases the risk and cost for private equity firms. On the other hand, if the core business asset is an intellectual property which can be institutionalized, codified, and eventually transferred independently of the founders or the original management team, one would expect the ideacore investment strategy to be cost mitigating. Hence, it is not clear ex-ante whether this strategy group will produce a positive or negative coefficient estimate in our regression models.
The fifth group is financial related. The preference for positive and stable cashflow have at least two implications. First, the PE firms may prefer low-risk investments, possibly because risk management is not a strength of the PE firm. If that is the case, these firms will likely find the risks of international investment particularly onerous. Second, it may also imply that the PE firms rely on a high leverage in the LBO deals, and the target companies need to generate stable cashflow to cover the debt payments. It may be difficult to finance such a highly leveraged deal in a foreign country domestically, and the PE firms may not have strong connections with the local banks in the target country. PE firms that look to maintain shareholder liquidity might need to take more costly actions in foreign countries where they have fewer business connections. All of these reasons would increase the cost of transactions. However, in an alternative view, most practitioners believe that a broad dichotomy in the investment strategies of PE firm managers is driven by their backgrounds.
The first type consists of former management consultants and corporate managers who emphasize operations and managerial engagements, which are more sensitive to distance and local settings, as their overarching value-adding proposition. The second type consists of former investment bankers and investment managers who emphasize financial engineering as their primary value-adding proposition. Hence, we allow the empirical test to reveal the more likely interpretation.
Regression Analysis: Strategy Groups
We first report results of estimating equation (5) using ordinary least squares with country fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. In Table 3 , we allow each proxy for transaction costs to enter separately, along with its interaction with dummy variables for each of the strategies. Firm performance enters every specification with a positive and significant coefficient, as do each of the proxies for transaction costs.
These two results suggest that LBO deals are influenced by some of the same forces that shape strategic M&A.
Turning to the interaction effects, we generally find negative and significant coefficients on both management and idea-core, and positive coefficients on consolidation. The negative sign on the strategy group of management is consistent with the view that the active managerial engagement with a company abroad brings costs to a PE firm. If a PE firm relies on such a strategy, it would be disadvantaged in the competition of cross-border transactions. The negative sign on the strategy group of idea-core confirms that PE firms that are specialized in managing intangible assets such as patents would be deterred from cross-border targets because of the possible legal risk or national security issues. These two strategy groups make PE firms particularly sensitive to frictions associated with remoteness, which is reflected in the larger (in absolute value) coefficient on cost proxies for these strategies.
Firms using a consolidation and growth strategy for their portfolio companies are less sensitive to transaction costs of remote ownership, consistent with the evidence in the international business literature that M&A is the preferred mode of entry for firms in distant markets.
The interaction effects of the cost proxies with the financial and positioning strategy dummies are negative and positive, but statistical significance is marginal. This suggests that both costs and benefits are associated with these two strategy groups and their overall empirical impact is ambiguous. Table 4 reports results for estimation of equation (4) using Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation (PMLE). Results are qualitatively very similar to the OLS results reported in Table 3 . In each specification, performance enters positively and significantly, and the six transaction cost proxies (including the cost index) enter negatively and significantly.
Moreover, each of the interaction terms with PE firm strategies enters consistently with the results of Table 3 . For the PMLE regressions, the consolidation and management interactions lack robust statistical significance. Note that in columns (1) and (2) we drop home-country fixed effects. This treatment is due to issues in getting the PMLE to converge with the full set. We were able to obtain convergence with the full set of fixed effects by using the Poisson conditional fixed effects estimator, described in Wooldridge (1999) , and found coefficients to be remarkably similar. We report the PMLE results because we are then able to cluster standard errors by firm.
While the qualitative results are largely unchanged between the OLS and PMLE specifications, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are much larger in absolute value in Table 4 . One possible explanation is that the OLS coefficients are biased toward zero because of the selection bias. PE Firms with low performance, with strategy profiles implying low transaction-cost mitigation, and paired with target countries that are remote from the home country, are likely to have no deals. These zeros are dropped in the OLS regressions, but they are explained by the independent variables. Dropping them would thus tend to lower the estimated effect of the independent variables. The PMLE regressions allow the data to explain the zeros so they do not suffer from this bias. Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) implement a two-step procedure to account for zero trade flows between country pairs.
Their method is similar to the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure, and requires a variable that explains zeros but is excluded from the main count/volume regression for identification.
Ideally, a measure of one-time fixed costs for a PE firm to enter each new market would serve this purpose, but finding a convincing variable in practice is difficult. In addition to this issue, a comparison of the PMLE results with the literature on other economic flows suggest they are in the right ball park. For example, the coefficient on ln distance is typically found
to equal approximately -1 in studies on trade flows and FDI (Head and Mayer, 2013) . We thus consider our PMLE regressions to be the preferred specification.
Regression Analysis: Cost Mitigation Index
The strategies are not mutually exclusive and a PE firm's strategy profile is a vector of dummies, one for each possible strategy. We define a cost mitigation index (CM I i ) based on the profile, using the formula
where I j is equal to 1 if the impact on cost mitigation of strategy j is negative, and equal to -1 if the impact is positive, and 1 ij is equal to 1 if a PE firm i employs a strategy j and zero otherwise. For expositional purposes, we scale the index so that the minimum value is equal to zero and the maximum is equal to one. The scaled measure is obtained by the linear transformation, CM I i = (CM I i − CM I min ) / (CM I max − CM I min ), where CM I min and CM I max refer to the minimum and maximum value of CM I i . We subsequently refer to the scaled measure as simply CM I i . Tables 3 and 4 , the CM I i is equal to
Based on the results in
As a preliminary exercise, we first investigate the prediction that firms with a low costmitigation index are more internationally intensive in their investments. Recall that CM I i is an inverse measure of cost mitigation. It corresponds to the theoretical value, z i , which determines the incidence of transaction costs at the bilateral country-pair level on the particular firm. We define international intensity as the ratio of cross-border acquisitions to domestic acquisitions. Figure 5 shows how the average international intensity of a PE firm varies with its cost-mitigation index. A clear negative relationship emerges, as predicted.
The plot provides some reassurance that the index is indeed picking up meaningful attributes of the PE firms.
In Tables 5 and 6 we proxy transaction costs with each component in the cost index, namely, the cross-border dummy, the logarithm of distance, the different official language dummy, and the different legal origins dummy. We test their interactions of the cost mitigation index in columns (2) to (5). Inspecting column (1) of Table 6 
Robustness Checks
We perform four robustness tests. The first test addresses a concern of endogenous strategies and performance. If the choice of managerial strategy is influenced by unique conditions in target countries or the choice to go abroad for acquisitions, our core regression specification will not properly test the theoretical model in equation (5) performance, our regression specification will be misguided.
Following Acharya, Gottschalg, Hahn, and Kehoe (2013), Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2008) , and Lee and Li (2014) , we employ human capital-based managerial expertise as instruments for both applied strategies of funds and performance.
9 Figure 3 provides the distribution of the nine expertise reported by PE firm managers according to Preqin.
These instruments intuitively map to each of five strategy groups in Table 2 used in the aggregated cost-mitigation index. Networking and industry knowledge link with consolidation and growth strategies; recruiting, operational and management advice link with management/human resources strategies; financial expertise link with financial strategies; market and strategic advice link with market positioning; and technical expertise link with idea-core strategies.
9 Detailed discussion and analysis on relating expertise to applied strategies and PE firm performance using the same data set can be found in Lee and Li (2014) .
Then in a properly designed two-stage least squares model, the estimated coefficients will measure the exogenous moderating effects of cost-mitigating strategies on the effect of transaction costs on the expected number of leveraged buyout deals, as intended to estimate equation (5). Table 7 shows consistency of signs and significance levels with generally larger magnitudes, suggesting correlated unobserved factors that have tended to bias the key coefficient estimates on the interaction terms upward.
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PE firms may invest in certain industries, and it is possible that our results are driven by deals in some particular industries. Even if that is the case, it may not affect our story. In the model, the characteristics of the target, with subscript s, are absent from the main test
equations (4) and (2), so their effects should not change the inferences that we are interested in. Nonetheless, it is still interesting to know how our strategy groups are related to target industries.
In Table 8 , we show the distribution of strategies in each target industry. Preqin provides the primary industry of the target. However, the industry classification does not follow any standard method, and there are 73 industries in the original data set. We group those industries into 12 broad categories, and Table 9 provides the details. Column (1) of Table 8 shows the percentage of targets in each industry category, out of the total number of deals of 8,815. The top 3 target industries are industrial (21.84%), consumer services (14.34%), and business services (9.53%). In columns (2) to (6), we show the percentage of strategy groups in each industry category, and they are largely consistent with the overall target percentage in column (1). For example, column (2) shows that 7,229 deals involve the strategy of consolidation and growth. Among those 7229 deals, there are respectively 21.80%, 14.26%, and 9.82% deals in the industry category of industrial, consumer service, and business service.
This pattern is robust to different industry classification methods. It suggests that those strategies do not cluster in certain particular industries.
As suggested in Table 1 , the U.S. based PE firms play a dominant role in the cross-border LBOs, and they represent about 60% of the deals. Our results could be driven by those U.S. In all of the regression analyses described above, we define the home country of each PE firm to be the country of its headquarters. Of the 663 PE firms in our sample, 222, or one third of the PE firms, have at least one foreign local establishment ("local office").
The number of local offices is highly skewed: roughly two thirds of PE firms with local offices have just one, while one PE firm (from the UK) has offices in 14 different foreign countries. PE firms with (more) foreign offices tend to have higher performance and to carry out more deals, and they are more likely to have local offices in countries that are closer. If the rationale for setting up a local office is to reduce distance-related agency costs, then this last fact is somewhat surprising: the benefits of a local office would be increasing in distance.
This puzzle can be explained if the costs of operating a foreign office are also increasing in distance-perhaps because of within-firm agency costs-and by the fact that the existence of a local office does not render distance to the PE firm's headquarters irrelevant.
In unreported regressions, we find that (i) the presence of a local office is associated with a larger number of deals in a country, and (ii) the marginal effect of distance on the number of deals is about one third as large for cases where a PE firm has a local office compared to cases where a PE firm does not have a local office in a country. These results are obtained by adding a local-office dummy variable and its interaction with distance to specification
(1) of Table 6 . Because PE firms are choosing if and where to operate local offices, we do not want to attach a causal interpretation to the finding that local offices are positively correlated with more deals. The estimated coefficient should be seen as a composite effect of an orientation of the PE firm toward the given market, and an actual effect of having a local office on the propensity to win deals in the market. Indeed, it is quite likely that firms will have unobserved orientations toward some markets for a number of reasons; for example, a general partner might be an immigrant from the country. We do, however, want to ensure that controlling for the local offices does not overturn our results regarding the interaction between transaction costs and cost mitigation. One reason for concern is that, because the presence of a local office makes distance-related costs less important, it is possible that the choice of operating a local office is related to the PE firm's cost mitigation ability. However, the inclusion of the local office dummy and its interaction with distance does not appreciably change the results in columns (2) to (6) of Table 6 ; in particular, the interaction effects between the cost mitigation index and the transaction cost variables remain statistically and economically significant.
Conclusion
In this paper we study the PE firm-and country-level determinants of cross-border leveraged buyouts. We find supporting evidence that macro variables relating to geography, culture, and institutions are correlated with the number of LBO deals occurring between country pairs. These results suggest that LBO deals are subject to many of the same frictions as other international economic flows, including trade in goods and services, direct investment by manufacturing firms, portfolio investment, and migration.
Using a detailed data set of PE firm characteristics, we investigate how PE firm heterogeneity across strategy and performance affects the number of target acquisitions in different countries. PE firms that consistently produce higher returns are better able to absorb the higher transactions costs of investing across borders. PE firms employing strategies that tend to mitigate the transaction costs of remote ownership obtain a competitive advantage in the international market for corporate control. The international intensity of these PE firms' acquisitions is higher than other PE firms with a similar level of performance. The results are consistent with a stylized model of an international competition for control and ownership of potential target companies. While the proximity-ability trade off is well-known, little attention has been paid to the ability of firms to circumvent costs of remote ownership through their strategic orientation. We believe the LBO context provides a relatively clean context in which to investigate this possibility. Table 2 : Strategy Classification This table presents the group of strategies. The sample of PE firms from 1986 to 2013 is collected from Preqin 2013. In the last column, the letter "S" denotes the strategy in the original data set, and the letter "T" denotes the target preference in the original data set.
Group
Strategy/ Target Table 5 : OLS Deal Count Regression II The baseline sample consists of 26,910 destination country-fund pairs, generated by 7,543 deals targeting 6,801 firms sponsored by 1,277 LBO funds (663 distinct PE firms) covering deals completed between 1986 and 2013. Details on data are provided in Section 4. Dependent variable is the logarithm of expected number of deals completed in destination country d by PE firm i in equation (5). After dropping X id = 0, the OLS specifications are estimated on a sub-sample of 1,616 observations. Cost index is defined in equation (6). Cost mitigating index (CMI) is defined in equation (7), which is an aggregate measure of strategies used in Table 3 . All errors are clustered at the PE firm level.
(1) (4). Cost index is defined in equation (6). Cost mitigating index (CMI) is defined in equation (7), which is an aggregate measure of strategies used in Table 3 . All errors are clustered at the PE firm level.
(1) Table 7 : 2SLS Deal Count Regression II The baseline sample consists of 26,910 destination country-fund pairs, generated by 7,543 deals targeting 6,801 firms sponsored by 1,277 LBO funds (663 distinct PE firms) covering deals completed between 1986 and 2013. Details on data are provided in Section 4. Dependent variable is the logarithm of expected number of deals completed in destination country d by PE firm i in equation (5). After dropping X id = 0, the OLS specifications are estimated on a sub-sample of 1,616 observations. Cost index is defined in equation (6). Cost mitigating index (CMI) is defined in equation (7), which is an aggregate measure of strategies used in Table ( 3). Performance and CMI are instrumented using nine managerial expertise data, which is available in Figure ( 3). All errors are clustered at the PE firm level.
(1) 
